ATTORNEYS-ATToRNEY

DISCHARGED WITHOUT CAUSE UNDER CON-

Only TO Quantum Meruit Aftei
SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENT OR JUDGMENT-Fracassev. Brent, 6 Cal.
3d 784, 494 P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972).

TINGENCY FEE CONTRACT ENTITLED

On January 1, 1970, George Fracasse, a duly licensed attorneyat-law in California, filed a complaint for declaratory relief against his
client, alleging that he was discharged without cause. He prayed that
his contingency contract be declared valid and that his one-third
interest in any monies ultimately recovered be preserved. The California Supreme Court, in Fracasse v. Brent,1 denied relief, and in the
process overruled- an extensive line of precedent by holding that an
attorney discharged without fault on his part was entitled to recover
in quantum meruit only.2 Further, the court found that since the contractual contingency had not yet occurred, no cause of action accrued,
even in quantum meruit, until the client successfully recovered a judgment or obtained a settlement.3 Prior to Fracasse, attorneys discharged
without cause could elect to recover their entire fee under the contingency agreement at the client's final judgment or settlement, 4 or
they could choose instead to sue at the time of discharge for the
reasonable value of their services. 5
In Baldwin v. Bennett,6 the keystone of California law on the
issue, it was held that a wrongfully discharged attorney was generally
entitled to damages amounting to the value of services performed plus
the damage sustained by the refusal to allow the performance of the
1 6 Cal. 3d 784, 494 P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972).
2 Id. at 792, 494 P.2d at 14-15, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91.
0 Id. at 792, 494 P.2d at 15, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
4 The language used in these cases indicates the broad application of this doctrine:
Jones v. Martin, 41 Cal. 2d 23, 256 P.2d 905 (1953) (attorney wrongfully discharged is
generally entitled to the same contingent compensation as if he had completed the services
contemplated); Denio v. City of Huntington Beach, 22 Cal. 2d 580, 140 P.2d 392 (1943)
(attorneys are entitled under the long-established rule in California to recover the compensation specified in their contract after a wrongful discharge); Zurich Gen. Accident
& [iab. Ins. Co. v. Kinsler, 12 Cal. 2d 98, 81 P.2d 913 (1938) (attorney may bring action
for damages amounting to full contingent fee if discharged without cause); Brown v.
Superior Court, 242 Cal. App. 2d 519, 51 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (attorney
employed on a contingent fee basis who is wrongfully discharged by his client may recover
the full contract amount as if he had completed the service); Fivey v. Chambers, 199 Cal.
App. 2d 457, 19 Cal. Rptr. 111 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (where an attorney is wrongfully
discharged he may recover damages equal to the fee specified in the contract).
5 See Echlin v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 2d 368, 375-76, 90 P.2d 63, 67 (1939); Tracy v.
MacIntyre, 29 Cal. App. 2d 145, 147-48, 84 P.2d 526, 528 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938).
6 4 Cal. 392 (1854).
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remainder of the contract. 7 Nevertheless, that court awarded the entire
contractual fee, finding that no accurate method existed for assessing
damages, and stating that defendant should not complain since his
lack of good faith produced the circumstances. 8 The Fracasse court
took issue with Baldwin's basic premise, seeing no practical reason why
.recovery on a quantum meruit theory could not adequately compensate
the attorney,9 thus terminating a 100-year-old principle of recovery.' 0
In disallowing the action for damages, California joined an established
minority of jurisdictions." However, the court espoused an incon7 Id. at 393.

8 Id. at 393-94. See also Webb v. Trescony, 76 Cal. 621, 622-23, 18 P. 796, 797 (1888).
9 6 Cal. 3d at 788, 494 P.2d at 12, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
10 The dissent in Fracasse noted with irritation that a century of California precedent
was being overruled. Id. at 802, 494 P.2d at 22, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
11 A leading case, Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46 (1916), involved a fixed
contingent sum to be awarded attorneys for obtaining a recovery in a condemnation
2 proceeding. The court held that the discharge of these attorneys did not constitute a
breach of contract, it being an implied term of the contract that the client may discharge
them at any time with or without cause. Once discharged the attorneys were limited to
recovery in quantum meruit. Id. at 173-74, 114 N.E. at 47-48. The court noted only two
possible exceptions to this rule: where the attorney has changed his position or incurred
expenses, and where an attorney is employed under a general retainer for a fixed period
to perform legal services in relation to matters that may arise during the period of the
contract. Id. at 176, 114 N.E. at 48. See In re Driscoll, 131 Misc. 613, 228 N.Y.S. 335 (Sup.
Ct. 1928), which interpreted the first exception as authority for adding expenses to the
reasonable value normally recovered. Other jurisdictions have used this provision to
significantly reduce the far-reaching holding of Martin. See in this connection In re
Winston's Will, 40 N.M. 348, 59 P.2d 904 (1936) (court noted that exceptions limited
Martin v. Camp to a narrow field); Roxana Petroleum Co. v. Rice, 109 Okla. 161, 235 P.
502 (1924) (attorney had changed his position and incurred expenses). Regarding the
latter exception, see Greenberg v. Remick & Co., 230 N.Y. 70, 129 N.E. 211 (1920) (attorney
employed for one year for a fixed sum, payable weekly, was wrongfully discharged and
eligible to receive damages).
In accord with Martin are: Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223, 21 A.2d 396 (1941) (attorney
discharged without fault is not entitled to recover damages); Gordon v. Morrow, 186 Ky.
713, 218 S.W. 258 (1920) (special counsel employed by the Governor of Kentucky were
limited to a recovery of the reasonable value of their services after a discharge without
cause); Mariana's Succession, 177 So. 464 (La. App. 1937) (attorney not entitled to damages
for breach of contract since a contract for legal services may be revoked at any time);
Clark v. Quinn, 203 Minn. 452, 281 N.W. 815 (1938) (client is permitted to terminate a
non-retainer contract at will, in which event counsel is entitled only to the reasonable
value of his services); Dill v. Public Util. Dist., 3 Wash. App. 360, 475 P.2d 309 (1970)
(attorney discharged from a contingent contract with or without cause is limited to a
recovery in quantum meruit).
This issue has not been heavily litigated in New Jersey. An early decision on point
was Weibezahl v. Huber, 39 N.J.L.J. 334 (Essex County Cir. Ct. 1916), where the court
stated:
"Every attorney enters into the service of his client subject to the rule that his
client may dismiss or supersede him at will; and if he makes a contract for future
services to his client, it is necessarily subject to such rule, and made with full-
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'gruous principle when it decreed that no cause of action for quantum
meruit accrued until after the contingency occurred. 12
Historically, an attorney's right to be compensated was not always
recognized. During the early period of the Roman Empire, an attorney
was supported by gratuities which he could not demand as a matter
of right, 3 because a proprietary link to the cause of action was deemed
14
to be an undesirable impediment to the administration of justice.
This "honorarium" system found acceptance in Europe and England,
but in the United States an attorney's right to compensation for his
services has always been recognized.'3 In the mid-1800's, the contingency contract, essentially an American institution, found general
acceptance as a form of compensation, and has continued to the present
as a popular fee arrangement. 16 Such an agreement generally provides
compensation for the attorney's services based on a percentage of the
final judgment or settlement, contingent upon the successful outcome
17
of the litigation.
knowledge that he may never perform such service, for the reason that his
client may not keep him, and that in that event he will not be paid therefor, but
will be entitled to compensation only for the services he has actually rendered."
Id. at 337 (quoting from Johnson v. Ravitch, 113 App. Div. 810, 812, 99 N.Y.S. 1059,
1061 (1906)). The court in Weibezahl went on to hold further that
"in such cases the counsel originally engaged will be protected in the matter of
compensation to the extent of the reasonable value of the services performed
down to the time the substitution [of attorneys] is allowed; and it is immaterial
that, under his agreement with the client, his compensation was to be contingent
.upon the successful outcome of the litigation ...."
39 N.J.L.J. at 335 (quoting from 2 E. THORNTON, Al-rORNEYS-AT-LAW 796 (1914)). See generally Annot., 136 A.L.R. 231 (1942).
12 See note 48 infra.
13 See E. WOOD, FEE CoNTRACrs OF LAWYERs 2-3 (1936); Browder, Lawyers' Fees Historically Considered, 50 AM. L. REv. 554, 554-55 (1916).
14 See Comment, Contingent Fee Contracts: Validity, Control and Enforceability, 47
IOWA L. REv. 942, 942 (1962).
15 See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 170-71 (1953); E. WOOD, supra note 13, at 8. However, early cases in New Jersey held that services were presumed to be gratuitous unless
performed pursuant to an express contract. See Seeley v. Crane, 15 N.J.L. 35 (Sup. Ct.
1835); Shaver v. Norris, 3 N.J.L. 470 (Sup. Ct. 1811). See generally Browder, supra note
13, at 559-62.
16 Wilkinson, The Contingent Fee, 34 N.J.L.J. 292, 293 (1911); Browder, supra note
13, at 562.
England still regards contingent fees as champertous. See Denning, The Price of
Freedom: We Must Be Vigilant Within the Law, 41 A.B.A.J. 1011 (1955), where the Lord
Justice observed that contingent contracts were cause for imprisonment in England, and
that the English system of partially subsidizing the litigant's costs would, in the United
States, probably be deemed an unjustifiable state interference in the legal process.
However, he suggested that the continued expansion of legal aid service could satisfy the
needs of those not financially able to obtain an attorney except on a contingent fee basis.
Id. at 1059.
17 See Comment, supra note 14, at 947.
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However, courts view contingent contracts with some suspicion.'5
They have frequently refused to enforce contracts which were deemed
unconscionable, relying on their inherent power to discipline individuals long considered to be officers of the court. 19 In some jurisdictions, this power has taken the form of court rules limiting the
percentage of a judgment which an attorney may claim under a contingent agreement. 20 The formulation of a schedule of maximum fees
can be considered a procedural means to prevent unreasonable compensation, 21 as long as an avenue for objecting to the sufficiency of
remuneration is available in exceptional cases. 22 This inherent power,
however, does not necessarily lend itself to the judicial construction
of an attorney's contract in the absence of unconscionable or sanc2
tionable behavior, as was the case in Fracasse. 3
'18 See Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 294-95, where the historical arguments concerning
the possible evils of contingent contracts are discussed.
19 See 60 COLUM. L. REv. 242, 245 (1960), and cases cited therein.
In New Jersey the power to discipline attorneys is established by the state constitution. N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 2,
3, provides: "The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction
over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted."
20 See Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43 (1959), which upheld the enforcement
of a schedule of maximum contingent fees in New York.
There is pending litigation in New Jersey over N.J.R. 1:21-7, which limits the percentage recoverable based on a contingent contract. A three-judge federal court, applying
principles of comity and abstention, refused to hear the suit until New Jersey courts had
reviewed arguments against imposition. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, Civil No. 64-72 (D.N.J., June 26, 1972). Plaintiffs in the suit are the New
Jersey Chapter of the American Trial Lawyers Association and the Bar Associations of
Hudson, Middlesex and Monmouth counties. The Trial Attorneys of New Jersey are
challenging the rule in a companion action. The complaint of the American Trial Lawyers
Association alleges
Ithat the rule deprives plaintiffs' members of liberty and property without due
process of law and denies them equal protection of the laws in that (a) it impairs
freedom of contract, (b) is not supported by any fact record developed at a hearing on notice, (c) has no publicly disclosed or actual fact nexus, (d) is unreasonable and arbitrary, (e) impairs obligations of contract since it applies retroactively
to retainers entered into and services rendered prior to its effective date, (f) is
discriminatory since it excepts subrogees, and fails to differentiate between types
of cases and applies only to tort cases. In addition, the complaint charges that
the rule is beyond the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by the New
Jersey Constitution.
95 N.J.L.J. 56 (1972).
21 See Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 109-12, 160 N.E.2d 43, 50-52 (1959) (broad court
powers to enact procedural rules to discipline attorneys and prevent unreasonable
compensation discussed).
22 See, e.g., N.J.R. 1:21-7, which provides in part:
(f) If at the conclusion of a matter an attorney considers the fee permitted
...
to be inadequate, an application on written notice to the client may be made
to the Assignment Judge for the hearing and determining of a reasonable fee
in light of all the circumstances.
23 Fracasse's complaint alleged that he was discharged without cause. 6 Cal. 3d at
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The Fracasse decision may be viewed as court regulation and
discipline of attorneys through the modification of existing substantive
case law. 24 In this restructuring of the attorney-client contractual

relationship, apparently the court was concerned with protecting
clients from possible double-payment of counsel fees. This result
frequently occurred because the discharged attorney could readily
recover his full contingent fee at the time final judgment or settlement
was reached, and the client's new attorney could simultaneously require
payment of his full fee. 25 However, the Fracasse court might have
considered an alternative to recovery in quantum meruit in the form
of damages less than the entire fee. Other jurisdictions award a discharged attorney the full fee minus the value of the services remaining
26
to be performed.
Basic to Fracasse is the absolute right to discharge an attorney.
This power, which enjoys universal recognition, is derived from the
"special confidence and trust" implicit in the attorney-client relationship. 27 Clothed in the vestments of an absolute right, it necessarily
conflicts with basic contract rights. 2 8 One of the few limitations on

the right to discharge occurs in situations where the attorney's power
786-87, 494 P.2d at 10, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 386. This contention is not disputed in the
opinion.
24 In the formulation of court rules, however, the courts have recognized their inability to promulgate substantive rules and have limited their reach to rules of procedure.
See Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 248, 74 A.2d 406, 410, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950);
Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 104, 106 N.E.2d 43, 47 (1959).
25 6 Cal. 3d at 789, 494 P.2d at 12, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 388. The court observed:
"The right to discharge is of little value if the client must risk paying the full
contract price for services not rendered upon a determination by a court that the
discharge was without legal cause. The client may frequently be forced to choose
between continuing the employment of an attorney in whom he has lost faith, or
risking the payment of double contingent fees equal to the greater portion of
any amount eventually recovered .. "
Id. (quoting from Salopek v. Schoemann, 20 Cal. 2d 150, 157, 124 P.2d 21, 25 (1942) (concurring opinion)).
26 See Henry v. Vance, 111 Ky. 72, 63 S.W. 273 (1901), where the court held that an
attorney, discharged from his contingent contract without cause, may recover as the
reasonable value of his services "the contract price, abated by such sum as is reasonably
represented by the unperformed part of the labor." Id. at 82, 63 S.W. at 276. The same
solution was reached in Bockman v. Rorex, 212 Ark. 948, 208 S.W.2d 991 (1948); Tonn v.
Reuter, 6 Wis. 2d 498, 95 N.W.2d 261 (1959).
27 See Salopek v. Schoemann, 20 Cal. 2d 150, 157, 124 P.2d 21, 24. See also Gage v.
Atwater, 136 Cal. 170, 172, 68 P. 581, 582 (1902); Weibezahl v. Huber, 39 JN.J.L.J. 334, 336
(Essex County Cir. Ct. 1916); Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 174, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916).
28 The dissent in Fracasse criticized the majority's total abrogation of basic contract
law governing the attorney-client relationship. 6 Cal. 3d at 796-97, 494 P.2d at 17-18, 100
Cal. Rptr. at 393-94. The conflict between the absolute right of a client to discharge his
attorney and the common-law right to damages for the breach of a valid, enforceable
contract is discussed in Comment, supra note 14, at 958-61.
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is coupled with an interest. 29 Recognizing this conflict, the Fracasse
court attempted to strike an equitable balance between the absolute
right to discharge and the traditional right to contract. The difficulty in
striking this balance is documented by the sharp division among jurisdictions regarding whether a discharge without cause can be considered
a breach of contract.3 0 In Gage v. Atwater,31 the power to discharge an
attorney was described as a "right.' 32 The court in Fracasse stated that
it would be anomalous to recognize the right established in Gage and
then penalize its operation by exacting damages. 33 Accordingly, the
discharge of Mr. Fracasse was held not to be a breach of contract
because the right to dismiss was a basic term of the contract, implied
by law.3 4 The implication of terms is a constructive device used by
29 See, e.g., United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v. Christian, 186 La. 689, 173 So. 174 (1937)

(client specifically assigned a percentage interest in the judgment to the attorney); Gulf,
C. & S.F. Ry. v. Miller, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 609, 53 S.W. 709 (1899) (client assigned one-half
interest in his cause of action to attorney). Generally a mere contingent contract does not
create an interest which prevents dismissal. See Isrin v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 153,
403 P.2d 728, 45 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1965). But see St. John The Baptist Greek Catholic Church
v. Gengor, 124 N.J. Eq. 449, 2 A.2d 337 (Ch. 1938), where an order for substitution of
solicitor would not be entered until the liens of the discharged attorneys were satisfied.
30 Compare Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46 (1916) (discharge of attorney
without cause is not a breach of contract), with Higgins v. Beaty, 242 N.C. 479, 88 S.E.2d
80 (1955) (discharged attorney allowed to sue for breach). See also Tenney v. Berger, 93
N.Y. 524, 45 Am. Rep. 263 (1883), where an attorney was permitted to withdraw from a
case and still recover the reasonable value of his services. The court found that the client
had hired a second attorney without his consent and there was friction between the
attorneys which prevented them from working together amicably, and went on to note
the anomalies of the attorney-client relationship:
If an attorney, without just cause, abandons his client before the proceeding for
which he was retained has been conducted to its termination, he forfeits all
right to payment for any services which he has rendered. The contract being
entire he must perform it entirely, in order to earn his compensation, and he is
in the same position as any person who is engaged in rendering an entire service,
who must show full performance before he can recover the stipulated compensation. While the attorney is thus bound to entire performance, and the contract
as to him is treated as an entire contract, it is a singular feature of the law that
it should not be treated as an entire contract upon the other side; for it is held
that a client may discharge his attorney, arbitrarily, without any cause, at any
time, and be liable to pay him only for the services which he has rendered up to
the time of his discharge.
Id. at 529, 45 Am. Rep. at 266.
31 136 Cal. 170, 68 P. 581 (1902).
32 Id. at 172, 68 P. at 582.
33 6 Cal. 3d at 791, 494 P.2d at 13, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
34 The court held:
We have concluded that a client should have both the power and the right at
any time to discharge his attorney with or without cause. Such a discharge does
not constitute a breach of contract for the reason that it is a basic term of the
contract, implied by law into it by reason of the special relationship between
the contracting parties, that the client may terminate that contract at will. It
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the courts to effectuate public policy without tarnishing the principles
35
of freedom of contract.
The upsurgence of consumer awareness may also have had some
effect on the thinking of the court in Fracasse. New legislation has
spurred courts into looking behind the boilerplate of commercial
contracts. 36 However, these new powers are usually employed where
there is some evidence of overreaching through the use of oppressive
37
contracts or a denial of expectations through some procedural abuse.
38
There was no indication of such abuses in Fracasse.
However, if the thrust of the Fracasse decision is viewed as protection of the client rather than punishment of the attorney for some
palpable wrong, then the court's reshaping of the law concerning discharged attorneys can be better understood. 39 Fracasse has essentially
required the discharged attorney to accept the consequences attaching
to discharge "for cause" although he may have been wrongfully discharged. 40 A California attorney dismissed for cause is only allowed
would be anomalous and unjust to hold the client liable in damages for exercising that basic implied right.
Id. at 790-91, 494 P.2d at 13, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
35 Professor Corbin stated:
In the more recent cases the courts are beginning to see and to admit that the
finding of an "implied term" or an "implied condition" is frequently a pure
construction by the court itself for the purpose of attaining a "just" result under
circumstances that the parties did not foresee and as to which they had no ideas
and made no provision.
3A A. CORBIN, CONTRAcrs § 632 (1960) (footnote omitted).
36 UCC § 2-302 provides:
(I) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
See generally Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931
(1969). Consumer protection also extends to credit. See The Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1970). See also Littlefield, Consumerism: A Review and
Preview, DENVER L.J. 12 (Special Issue 1971); LoPucki, The Uniform Consumer Credit
Code: Consumer's Code-Or Lender's Code?, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 335 (1970).
37 See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (naive
consumer confronted with high pressure tactics not bound by contract if unconscionable);
In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (one-sided, oppressive contract
bearing no relation to business risks not enforceable); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (attempted disclaimer of implied warranty of
merchantability invalid as against public welfare). See generally Ellinghaus, In Defense of
Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
38 See note 23 supra.
39 See 6 Cal. 3d at 792, 494 P.2d at 14, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 390, where the Fracasse
court discussed the protection of the client versus the imposition on the attorney.
40 See Moore v. Fellner, 50 Cal, 2d 330, 325 P,2d 857 (1958) (attorney discharged from
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reasonable compensation for services performed prior to dismissal,
and in the case of a contingency contract, recovery must await the
occurrence of that contingency-the successful settlement or recovery
by the client.41 Formerly, loss of confidence would constitute cause only
if based on substantial and reasonable grounds. 42 In Fracasse the
definition of "cause" is extended to include where, for any reason
whatsoever, there is the smallest loss of confidence by the client in the
attorney's skill. 43 This redefinition enables the Fracassecourt to apply
44
prior California law regarding discharge for cause.
While the significance of limiting a discharged attorney's recovery
to quantum meruit is substantial, perhaps the more interesting element
of the Fracasse decision is its holding which denies the recovery of the
contingent contract for cause is limited to recovery in quantum meruit and cause of
action does not arise until successful settlement or judgment).
41 Id.
42 In Moser v. Western Harness Racing Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 2d 1, 200 P.2d 7 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1948), the court held that
irrespective of any question of negligence the client is justified in discharging
his attorney if the latter has given reasonable cause for loss of confidence in his
ability or integrity. . . . [T]he dissatisfaction which will justify termination of
an attorney's employment, as for cause, must be based upon reasonable grounds
and not the mere whim of the client or a critical and unreasonable attitude,
with which attorneys frequently have to contend. Conduct of the attorney
which does not furnish substantial grounds for distrust or lack of confidence
will not absolve the client from liability for a wrongful termination of the employment.
Id. at 7-8, 200 P.2d at 11. A determination regarding whether "cause" for discharge exists
was necessarily complex, but deemed essential. See Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co.
v. Kinsler, 12 Cal. 2d 98, 81 P.2d 913 (1938), where the court stated:
With respect to a determination of whether the discharge of an attorney
has been "without cause", it is obvious that no precise act or fixed line of
conduct on the part of the attorney may be accurately defined or specified as
furnishing a sufficient reason for an application of the rule against him. Manifestly, "cause" which in legal contemplation would justify the cancellation of a
contingent contract for compensation on account of legal services thereafter to
be rendered, necessarily would have to depend upon the particular circumstances
that were present in each case.
Id. at 101, 81 P.2d at 915.
43 6 Cal. 3d at 790, 494 P.2d at 13, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
44 The dissenting opinion noted the apparent unfairness of this approach:
Finally, I point out that by holding that "It should be sufficient that the
client has, for whatever reason, lost faith in the attorney, to establish 'cause' for
discharging him" . . . the majority actually propose a subjective test for determining breach in respect to an attorney-client contract. However, for all
practical purposes, their rule frees the client even from an obligation of good
faith and permits him to escape at will from the terms of his contract. This new
rule violates the most basic principle of contract law-that a party's actions will
be judged according to objective standards of reasonableness. Ironically and
incongruously, the result of the majority's holding is that although an objective
test is applied to determine whether a contract has been formed . . . , a subjective test is now to be applied to determine whether it has any legal effect.
6 Cal. 3d at 802, 494 P.2d at 21-22, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 397-98,
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reasonable value of services by the discharged attorney until, and only
45
if, the client successfully recovers in the underlying cause of action.
As a general principle of agency law, after a discharge, the right of a
party to compensation for previous services still depends upon the
provisions of the rescinded contract. 40 However, when the rescinded
contract contemplates a future contingency, it is anomalous to both
rescind the contract and also cause it to operate in the future to determine the rights of the parties.47
Other jurisdictions have held that a cause of action for quantum
meruit accrues immediately after a wrongful discharge. 48 Thus, the
45 Id. at 791-92, 494 P.2d at 14, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
40 See discussion in 5A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1229 (1964), wherein the author

stated:
In contracts of agency or other employment, it is often provided that one
or both of the parties shall have the power to terminate the agency or employment at any time (or on specified conditions) by giving notice. When the
required notice is given, neither party is under a duty of further performance;
the contract may be said to be "discharged." Yet the rights of the parties with
respect to performances rendered or breaches committed before the notice became
operative still depend upon the provisions of the "discharged" contract.
Regarding a discharged attorney's right to compensation, see generally 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1095 (1964); 10 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1285A (3d ed. 1967), and cases cited
therein.
47 The dissent in Fracasse noted the inconsistency:
[The] plaintiff-attorney, although discharged without cause, may not use the
terms of the contract to measure his damages. Contradictorily, the majority also
say that plaintiff's recovery for even the reasonable value of his services is subject
to the contractual term that compensation is contingent upon the success of
defendant's personal injury suit.
6 Cal. 3d at 804, 494 P.2d at 23, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
48 See Cox v. Trousdale, 138 Kan. 633, 27 P.2d 298 (1933) (citing Martin v. Camp,
219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46 (1916), as authority for the accrual of a cause of action in
quantum meruit at the time of discharge); Inman v. Gonzales, 89 So. 2d 914 (La. Ct. App.
1956) (cause of action in quantum meruit would be proper at time of discharge); Tillman
v. Komar, 259 N.Y. 133, 181 N.E. 75 (1932) (it was contrary to the rights of a substituted
attorney that he be required to await the outcome of the litigation before he would
receive compensation for his services performed under a percentage contract); Sundheim
v. Beaver County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 140 Pa. Super. 529, 14 A.2d 349 (1940) (attorney
may have a cause of action for the reasonable value of services although present contract
action is barred by the non-occurrence of a condition precedent-recovery by the client in
the underlying action); Wright v. Johanson, 132 Wash. 682, 233 P. 16, aff'd on rehearing,135
Wash. 696, 236 P. 807 (1925) (cause of action for quantum meruit accrued at discharge of
attorney). See also Thompson v. Smith, 248 S.W. 1070, 1073 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923),
where although the issue was not decided, the language of the court indicated quite
strongly the irrelevance of the breached contract in a determination of future rights.
California, prior to the holding in Fracasse, was in accord with the above body of
authority. See Tracy v. MacIntyre, 29 Cal. App. 2d 145, 84 P.2d 526 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938).
It should be carefully noted that in the above decisions the action was in quantum
meruit. In jurisdictions where suit is allowed for the recovery of damages or the entire
fee, the attorney may elect to sue on a contract theory. In this case he may be required
to await the contingency. See Bartlett v. Odd-Fellows' Sav. Bank, 79 Cal. 218, 21 P. 743, 12
Am. Rep. 139 (1889); Inman v. Gonzales, 89 So. 2d 914 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
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New York Court of Appeals concluded in Tillman v. Komar4 9 that a
discharged attorney could sue upon dismissal in quantum meruit.50
In explaining the rationale, the court pointed out the vulnerable
position in which the discharged attorney might be placed:
This [attorney] did not contract for his contingent compensation
on the hypothesis of success or failure by some other member of
the bar. A successor may be able to obtain far heavier judgments
than the efforts of the original attorney could secure, or, on the
other hand, inferior equipment of a different lawyer might render
futile an attempt to prove damage to the client. 51
The Fracasse court, however, was not ultimately concerned with
potential unfairness to the discharged attorney. It concluded that the
imposition of a judgment for the attorney against a possibly indigent
ex-client was the primary consideration:
The client may and often is very likely to be a person of limited
means for whom the contingent fee arrangement offers the only
realistic hope of establishing a legal claim. Having determined
that he no longer has the trust and confidence in his attorney
necessary to sustain that unique relationship, he should not be
held to have incurred an absolute obligation to compensate his
former attorney. Rather, since the attorney agreed initially to take
his chances on recovering any fee whatever, we believe that the fact
that the success of the litigation is no longer under his control is
insufficient to justify imposing a new and more onerous burden on
52
the client.
The court also reasoned that it would be impossible to reach a determination of the reasonable compensation due an attorney "until
the matter has finally been resolved." 53 It is interesting to note that to
support this contention the court in Fracasse relied on Brown v.
Connelly,54 where an attorney sought recovery of his entire fee under a
contingent fee contract.5 5 Recovery was denied because there could be
no cause of action against the client "for compensation based upon a
contingency fee contract until the happening of the stated contingency."58 However, the Fracasse court did not point out that this
49 259 N.Y. 133, 181 N.E. 75 (1932).

Id. at 136, 181 N.E. at 76.
51 Id. at 135-36, 181 N.E. at 76.
52 6 Cal. 3d at 792, 494 P.2d at 14, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
53 Id.
54 2 Cal. App. 3d 867, 83 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
55 Id. at 869, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
56 Id. at 871, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 160. It is interesting to note that the majority in
Fracasse used almost these exact words. However, they removed the emphasis on "based on
a contingent fee contract" as it existed in Brown and substituted their own emphasis on
the word "compensation." See 6 Cal. 3d at 787, 494 P.2d at 11, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 387. Thus
the Fracasse court derived an implication unintended by the court in Brown.
50
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rule was applied in Brown only because the attorney sought the full
contingent fee and not recovery in quantum meruit.57 Thus Brown is
weak authority for the proposition that quantum meruit recovery must
await the occurrence of the contingency.5"
Prior to Fracasse an attorney always retained something of value
before and after a discharge without cause. Before discharge, he held
the valuable privilege of litigating a controversy for a contingent
compensation.59 After a discharge, he retained the valuable right to an
immediate cause of action in quantum meruit.60 The Fracassedecision
has extinguished a right to an immediate cause of action and converted
this valuable interest in the litigation into a gamble on an unknown
attorney. Further, the discharged attorney, after risking his time and
effort toward a possible recovery, delivers this investment into strange
hands in return not for definite compensation, but for a contingent
compensation over which he has no control. 61 In applying this new
57 The Brown court stated:
"It is well settled that where the attorney is wrongfully discharged before he has

completely performed his contract, he may recover from the client damages for
such breach, the measure of damages being the fee specified in the contract, or
recover on a quantum meruit for the reasonable value of his services." . . . It
must be noted, however, . . . at least where an attorney relies solely on his
contingency fee agreement, his cause of action does not accrue until the happening of the specified contingency.
2 Cal. App. 3d at 870, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 160 (quoting in part from Fivey v. Chambers, 199
Cal. App. 2d 457, 463, 19 Cal. Rptr. 111, 115 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962)).
58 Applicable precedent was disposed of by the Fracasse court in a footnote disapproving Tracy v. MacIntyre, 29 Cal. App. 2d 145, 84 P.2d 526 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938) (cause
of action in quantum meruit accrued immediately upon wrongful discharge of the
attorney). See 6 Cal. 3d at 792 n.4, 494 P.2d at 14, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
59 The outcome of litigating a controversy and losing, being the full contractual
benefit bargained for, must be considered compensation under the circumstances. See 1
A. CoRIN, CONTRACTS § 148 (1963) (footnotes omitted), wherein he stated:
,A promise is not made insufficient as a consideration for a return promise
by the fact that it is conditional, even though the condition is one that is purely
fortuitous and may never happen at all. A promise that is subject to such a
fortuitous condition is called an "aleatory" promise. It is a chance-taking
promise, but is not necessarily an illegal wager even under various statutes
directed against gambling....
If a seeming promise is made conditional upon an event that can not occur
at all, as the promisor knows, no real promise has been made. . . . If, on the
other hand, the promise is conditional upon an event that may possibly occur,
it is not illusory; and it is not made an insufficient consideration by the fact
that the probability that the event will occur is very slight.
60 See Tracy v. Maclntyre, 29 Cal. App. 2d 145, 84 P.2d 526 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938).
For other jurisdictions, see note 48 supra.
61 The dissent in Fracasseobserved:
By thus selectively retaining parts of the contract, even though it has been disaffirmed, the majority violate the rule that the contract must be preserved or
eliminated in its entirety. Their explanation that plaintiff agreed "to take his
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doctrine of recovery, care must be given to protect the investment
interest of the discharged attorney.62 Contingent contracts are not
formed as simple, salaried propositions, but are in essence an application of risk capital seeking higher returns. 63 A determination of
the value of a discharged attorney's services, which did not consider
the contingent nature of his enterprise, would tend to be unreasonable.

64

From a practical standpoint, when an attorney must look to a
recovery in futuro, procedural safeguards become crucial. 65 The discharged attorney is unable to monitor the progress of the litigation
and may not be informed of a final judgment or settlement. 66 Yet in
Fracassethe court held that not only had a cause of action for quantum
meruit recovery not yet accrued, but further, that the attorney was not
chances on recovering any fee whatever" . . . disregards the substantial change
in risk that results when plaintiff is prevented from managing the litigation.
6 Cal. 3d at 804, 494 P.2d at 23, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
62 See comments by Phillip G. Auerbach, President of the Trial Attorneys of New
Jersey, writing in regard to N.J.R. 1:21-7, which limits the percentage of recovery in
contingent fee contracts. 94 N.J.L.J. 818 (1971). Mr. Auerbach estimated that an attorney
will invest anywhere from $500.00 to $10,000.00 in a file.
63 See Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in PersonalInjury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1150 (1970), where the authors examined why
the returns on contingent contracts are higher than a corresponding hourly wage. They
also noted that risk taking rests most heavily on lawyers with few cases and on small
firms. The importance of this is that the Fracasse case shifts an additional uncertainty or
risk upon the attorney. The total effect will create an additional disadvantage for attorneys who are building a practice.
64 In estimating the reasonable value of the services rendered by an attorney, courts
generally consider the contingent nature of the contract. See Simler v. Conner, 352 F.2d
138 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 928 (1966); Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Grandbush,
162 F. Supp. 796 (W.D. Ark. 1958); In re Lanza's Estate, 229 Cal. App. 2d 720, 40 Cal. Rptr.
528 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); In re Cusimano, 174 Misc. 1068, 22 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sur. Ct. 1940).
65 The dissent in Fracasse observed that it was essential for the attorney to establish
his claim in judgment form as early as possible. 6 Cal. 3d at 795, 494 P.2d at 16-17, 100
Cal. Rptr. at 392-93. The dissent further noted:
The discharged attorney obviously desires to secure a conditional determination
of his right to recover his fee before the trial or settlement of the personal injury
action so that he can reach any proceeds before his former client disposes of
them. If, as the majority assert, contingent fee contracts frequently involve
clients of limited means, prompt establishment of an interest in a portion of the
proceeds may therefore be essential to recovery. The attorney who eventually
brings the personal injury action to judgment or settlement may have the first
opportunity to resort to the proceeds. The attorney who is discharged without
cause should certainly receive comparable protection.
Id. (footnote omitted).
66 There will be instances where the client will be willing to take the fruits of
recovery without paying for the services that obtained it. See Berman, The Attorney's
Lien in New York-A New Look, 6 N.Y.L.F. 300 (1960). If attorneys need protection while
they are handling the case (id. at 303-04), the need will increase when they are not.
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entitled to a declaratory judgment. 67 The California Declaratory Relief
Act enables the courts to make a binding determination regarding
rights in property or under contract whenever an actual controversy
exists.

68

The statute has been liberally construed for the purpose of

eliminating "uncertainties and controversies which might result in
future litigation." 69 The judicial power that the statute provides has
been used to interpret the terms of an attorney's contract, 70 to declare the
rights of remaindermen under certain future contingencies 71 and to
determine possible liability of parties to a breached contract before
an adjudication on the merits. 72 However, the court in Fracasse held
that since the cause of action did not accrue until the happening
of the contingency, there was "no present controversy such as would
justify the court in exercising its discretion to entertain an action for
78
declaratory relief."
6 Cal. 3d at 792-93, 494 P.2d at 15, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
The California Declaratory Relief Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person interested under a deed, will or other written instrument, or
under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his rights or duties with respect
to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property, or with respect to the
location of the natural channel of a watercourse, may, in cases of actual con:troversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an
original action in the superior court or file a cross-complaint in a pending action
in the superior or municipal court for a declaration of his rights and duties in
the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under such instrument or contract.
CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1060 (West Supp. 1972).
69 Mefford v. City of Tulare, 102 Cal. App. 2d 919, 922, 228 P.2d 847, 849 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1951). The court stated:
The purpose of declaratory relief is to liquidate uncertainties and controversies which might result in future litigation and whether a determination is
proper in an action for declaratory relief is a matter within the trial court's
discretion.
Id. California courts have held that the statute is to be liberally construed in order
to effectuate its purpose. See In re San Joaquin Light ic Power Corp., 52 Cal. App. 2d
814, 127 P.2d 29 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942); Tolle v. Struve, 124 Cal. App. 263, 12 P.2d 61 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1932).
70 See Blakeslee v. Wilson, 190 Cal. 479, 213 P. 495 (1923) (declaratory judgment
sought to determine whether an attorney was entitled to a percentage of future judgment
or to fixed sum). In New Jersey, the Declaratory Relief statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:16-50
et seq. (1952), has been applied to attorney's contracts. See Murphy v. Westfield Trust
Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 389, 20 A.2d 359 (Ch. 1941), afl'd, 130 N.J. Eq. 600, 23 A.2d 564 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1942) (right of attorneys to declaratory judgment declaring their rights and
status under a retainer agreement recognized).
71 See Caldwell v. Rosenberg, 47 Cal. App. 2d 143, 117 P.2d 366 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941)
(contingent remainders of life beneficiary's children constituted a present legal equitable
right which parties could protect by declaratory judgment).
72 See Sattinger v. Newbauer, 123 Cal. App. 2d 365, 266 P.2d 586 (Dist. Ct. App.
1954) (right to declaratory judgment interpreting partnership contract upheld although
issue could be mooted by future judgment on merits regarding alleged breach of contract).
78 6 Cal. 3d at 792-93, 494 P.2d at 15, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
67
68
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Fracasse was seeking a determination of his right to recover his
fee conditioned upon eventual settlement or judgment in favor of his
former client.7 4 He had an interest in the proceeds of the action which

he was attempting to protect, and the declaratory judgment would be
evidence of his interest similar to a lien.7 5 To create a lien at common
law the lienor was normally required to have possession of the subject
property.7 6 An exception to this is the attorney's charging lien which
encumbers a judgment attained through his efforts. 7 7 In California

the charging lien is granted by contractual consent and is not implied
by the mere formation of a contingent contract. 78 Also, there is no
general statutory grant of a lien on the client's cause of action as exists
in other states.7

9

As a consequence, any execution not founded on an

equitable lien would be effected by statutory attachment proceedings
after final recovery by the client.8° While an existing declaratory judgId. at 786-87, 494 P.2d at 10, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
Id. at 795, 494 P.2d at 16-17, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93.
It may not, however, be possible for the declaratory judgment to operate as a lien.
In Rosenberg v. Lawrence, 10 Cal. 2d 590, 75 P.2d 1082 (1938), a controversy arose over
the compensation due attorneys for litigation they had carried to a stipulation of entry
of judgment for the plaintiff. The trial court declared that the attorneys would be
entitled to 50% of the recovery. The California Supreme Court sustained this holding as
far as it defined the compensation due the attorneys but struck out parts of the judgment
which declared that a portion of the client's recovery belonged to the attorneys. The court
held that new substantive rights could not be created by declaratory judgment, under the
guise of doing equity, when there otherwise was no right to a lien. Id. at 594-95, 75 P.2d
at 1084-85.
76 See Brauer v. Hotel Associates, Inc., 40 N.J. 415, 419-20, 192 A.2d 831, 833-34
(1963), where the various common law liens available to the attorney were discussed.
77 Id. at 420, 192 A.2d at 834. See generally Annot., 143 A.L.R. 204 (1943).
The charging lien is equitable in nature because there is no possession of the subject
property, See the comparison of the common law (possessory) lien and the principle of
equitable assignment (charging lien) in In re McCormick's Estate, 14 N.J. Misc. 73, 75-76,
182 A. 485, 486-87 (Bergen County Orphans' Ct. 1936). See generally Berman, supra note
66, at 303-04; 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 211 (1937).
78 See Echlin v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 2d 368, 90 P.2d 63 (1939); Rosenberg v.
Lawrence, 10 Cal. 2d 590, 75 P.2d 1082 (1938).
79 See, e.g., American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Niebuhr, 124 N.J. Eq. 372, 2 A.2d 46 (Ch.
1938), where the attorney's statutory charging lien on a judgment recovered by a substituted attorney was preserved. The basis for the creation of a lien prior to the existence
of a judgment is N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:13-5 (1952), which gives the attorney a lien on
the cause of action.
80 CAL.CIV. PRO. CODE § 537 (West Supp. 1972) provides in part:
The plaintiff, at the time of issuing the summons, or at any time afterward,
may have the property of the defendant attached, . . . as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered, unless the defendant gives
security to pay such judgment, as in this chapter provided, in the following
cases:
1. In an action upon a contract, express or implied, for the direct payment
of money ....
74

75
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ment might expedite these proceedings, it would not enhance the position of the attorney as a creditor. 81
The economic impact of Fracasseon California attorneys may not
be fully realized. Currently in California, a wrongfully discharged
attorney can recover his full fee after the breach of a non-contingent
contract. 82 However, recovery may soon be limited to quantum meruit,
since the Fracassecourt couched its decision in terms broad enough to
apply to non-contingent agreements. 8 3 This result would be in accord
with the experience of New York following Martin v. Camp,8 4 where
a wrongfully discharged attorney was entitled to recovery only in
quantum meruit under a contingent contract. 85 This limitation on
recovery was subsequently applied to non-contingent arrangements.86
However, an attorney's right to immediate recovery in quantum meruit
after wrongful discharge under a non-contingent contract should remain unaffected by the Fracasse holding, as the basis for postponing
recovery (burden to client with limited means) does not exist for the
client who is financially able to retain counsel on a non-contingent
basis. New York would allow immediate recovery in quantum meruit
87
under either contractual arrangement.
Since the contingent fee arrangement is an established medium
for supplying justice to the indigent, careful consideration must be
81 See note 75 supra, where the use of a declaratory judgment as a lien was questioned. This shortcoming raises doubts whether a declaratory judgment can prevent a
client from disbursing his judgment, absent any attachment proceedings.
82 See Oliver v. Campbell, 43 Cal. 2d 298, 273 P.2d 15 (1954) (general rule applied
although attorney sought recovery in quantum meruit); Webb v. Trescony, 76 Cal. 621,
18 P. 796 (1888) (attorney discharged without cause granted full contract fee).
83 They held specifically:
[A]n attorney discharged with or without cause is entitled to recover the reasonable value of his services rendered to the time of discharge. . . . We further hold
that the cause of action to recover compensation for services rendered under a
contingent fee contract does not accrue until the occurrence of the stated contingency.
6 Cal. 3d at 792, 494 P.2d at 14-15, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91.
84 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46 (1916). See discussion note II supra.
85 219 N.Y. at 174, 114 N.E. at 48.
86 See In re Montgomery's Estate, 272 N.Y. 323, 6 N.E.2d 40 (1936). For other jurisdictions see generally Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 604, 619 (1957).
87 See Tillman v. Komar, 259 N.Y. 133, 181 N.E. 75 (1932) (attorney discharged from
contingent contract allowed immediate recovery in quantum meruit). For non-contingent
contracts there is no contractual basis for delaying the time of recovery. See In re
Montgomery's Estate, 272 N.Y. 323, 6 N.E.2d 40 (1936), where the court emphasized the
irrelevance of the fallen contract by holding that the contract price does not limit the
recovery in quantum meruit since the contract either "'wholly stands or totally fails.' " Id.
at 327, 6 N.E.2d at 41 (quoting from Tillman v. Komar, 259 N.Y. 133, 135, 181 N.E. 75,
75 (1932)).
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given to it before modifying its operation. 88 The balance of economic
exchange and risk-taking must be considered from both the client's
and the attorney's viewpoint. The client in many instances cannot
afford to assume an absolute obligation and may, therefore, feel compelled to remain with an attorney in whom he has lost faith. The client
also gains bargaining power by having the termination sword with
which to prod a recalcitrant attorney. The attorney, on the other hand,
as a businessman, must calculate the risk of discharge into his fees.
Otherwise, he must shy away from contingent arrangements or accept
smaller returns. Thus, the Fracasse decision has shifted the balance in
California to favor the client and in doing so has reduced the efficacy
of the contingent contract.
Thomas L. Adams
88 For an analysis of the economic decisions made by parties to a contingent fee
contract and the influence of each party's desire to maximize returns, see Schwartz &
Mitchell, supra note 63, at 1125-26.

